

1 **U.S. Regional Climate Change and Impacts 2010-2050:**
2 **Temperature and the Energy Sector**

3
4 To be submitted to *Weather, Climate, and Society*

5
6 April 3, 2009

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26 **ABSTRACT**

27 As climate science has advanced, enormous amounts of data have been collected by satellite and
28 *in situ* platforms observing the Earth system and from computer models of this system. This paper
29 utilizes a sub-set of this data to develop projections of surface temperature change for five U.S.
30 regions and summarizes critical findings from past research reported in the scientific literature to
31 provide an outlook for how these changes will affect the energy sector.

32 Key summary findings are the following. Over the past 100 years, global temperatures have risen
33 on the order of 0.6 °C. Seasonally the greatest warming has come in the winter months and
34 regions closer to the Poles have warmed at a faster rate than regions closer to the equator. For the
35 U.S. overall, a consensus of climate models predicts that winter temperatures will warm further by
36 0.8 °C and that summer temperatures will warm further by 0.7 °C by the 2040s. For both seasons
37 the warming will be greatest in the central and western part of the country. By the middle of the
38 century, U.S. northern regions will experience energy consumption decreases from space heating
39 that exceed similar increases from cooling of buildings, and the reverse is true in the southern
40 regions. By the 2040s, changes in patterns of energy consumption will be large, but averaged over
41 the annual cycle and over the 48 contiguous states there will be an approximate balance with a net
42 increase of 10% or less.

43 The uncertainties associated with the projected warming are large. The more specific the
44 prediction, the smaller the effective degree of spatial and temporal averaging, and therefore the
45 uncertainty is greater. It is anticipated that these uncertainties will be reduced as climate change
46 science advances over the next several years.

47 **1. Introduction**

48 The global climate has been changing rapidly over the last century. Although a variety of records
49 from past eras indicate that variations have always occurred, current rates of change are
50 unprecedented. Most of the world's climate scientists have attributed these changes to human
51 activities in the industrial era. In particular, the amount of carbon dioxide (CO₂) added to the
52 atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas, and from the destruction
53 of once vast forests, has interacted with the Earth's outgoing infrared (radiant) energy to trap heat
54 in the atmosphere and raise the temperature overall. Additional greenhouse gases (GHGs) have
55 supplemented the heating due to CO₂. Nevertheless this is a complex system, and other factors,
56 such as storage of heat in the oceans, have acted to mitigate some of the overall heating. The
57 impact of GHGs is expected to continue in this century and beyond. Yet, the local effects are not
58 uniform; atmosphere and ocean regional circulations can dominate regional temperature change.

59 Over the last several decades the science of climate change has progressed from a theory, to a
60 search for signs of change, to the development of complex computer modeling of the doubled CO₂
61 climate, to increasingly definitive evidence of global warming, to climate forecasts for different
62 regions over the next several decades to hundreds of years. While human activities contribute to
63 climate change, a changing climate impacts our health, comfort, safety, environment, agriculture,
64 industry, and transportation. As climate science has advanced, enormous amounts of data have
65 been collected by satellite and in situ platforms observing the Earth system (that is, the
66 atmosphere, ocean, ice sheets, and solid earth) and from computer models of the Earth system.
67 This paper uses a sub-set of the collected data to develop projections of surface temperature

68 change for five U.S. regions and summarizes critical findings from past research reported in the
69 scientific literature to provide an outlook for how these changes will affect the energy sector.

70 Future projections of climate change are often made using complex models of the atmosphere and
71 ocean that are based on known physical principles. When evaluating a number of such
72 atmospheric models, from the world's principal weather centers and universities, the results, while
73 not identical, typically have a great deal of commonality. Arguably, the average of such model
74 projections provides the best estimate of climate trends. Additionally, from the spread of the
75 model projections we have a measure of the uncertainty of our estimate. Impacts of the expected
76 changes in temperature are important for a host of reasons for our society. How such changes
77 impact the consumption and production of energy is fundamental in our economy. Of primary
78 importance is the impact of the change in temperature on space heating and cooling of residential
79 spaces.

80 **2. Regional Temperature variability and projections**

81 Temperature at the Earth's surface constitutes the climate variable upon which most global change
82 measures have been focused, in part because it is critical to human habitability and to society's
83 energy consumption. Therefore observations of the historical record of surface temperature as well
84 as models simulating the likely future variations in temperature are important records in the
85 evaluation of global change. That the mean temperature over the globe is increasing is
86 documented in a series of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a
87 body sponsored by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environmental
88 Panel, to evaluate scientific observations, research, and implications of climate variability.

89 Solomon et al. (2007) summarize the technical findings of the fourth and most recent report in this
90 series. In what follows, unless otherwise noted, we will report temperature differences (increases
91 or decreases) between a projected decadal average of a future period, usually the 2040s, and
92 observed conditions during the 1990s. We will also report temperature trends in terms of °C per
93 decade based on linear fits to observed or modeled data.

94 The variability in temperature, as well as in other important climate indices (c.f., Fig. 1.1 of IPCC,
95 2007), reveals clearly important changes over the last century or longer. For surface temperature,
96 there is a general increase in the last 100 years of approximately 1 °C. Along with records noting
97 the increasing positive trend in general, evidence is mounting that the warming is accelerating.
98 Figure 1 shows that the last eight years plus 1998 are the nine warmest years within since the
99 1950s. To determine the global mean temperature (as in Fig. 1), measurements are weighted
100 according to area. Similar averages are also often calculated separately for both hemispheres, for
101 land and ocean regions, and for different seasons. It is shown that studying seasonal temperature
102 trends is important to energy use because of varying implications of inhomogeneous temperature
103 increases during different seasons for heating and cooling.

104 The change over the half-century 1950-1999 comes from temperature increases over many areas
105 of the globe but in particular from the landmasses of the Northern Hemisphere as shown in Fig. 2.
106 These trends are based on a linear in time fit to the gridded observation data set of the Climate
107 Research Unit (University of East Anglia, U.K; Brohan et al. 2006). Whereas most of the regions
108 in the world have had a positive temperature trend, we note that the largest increases are in the
109 high latitude regions in and bordering the Arctic Ocean, particularly areas of Siberia and Alaska.
110 The U.S. has had a positive temperature trend of between 0.5 and 1.5 °C, except that the region

111 around the Gulf Coast shows a smaller warming. Alaska, as noted, has the largest U.S. observed
112 increases, between 1 and 3 °C. Seasonally, the period of Northern Hemisphere winter, December-
113 January-February (DJF), experienced the largest trends of the four seasons, according to the 50-
114 year analysis.

115 The IPCC and others have concluded that it is probable that the trends are related to human causes,
116 due principally to the amount of GHGs that have been injected into the atmosphere where levels
117 are considerably higher than what they were in pre-industrial times.

118 The main GHG that has changed is CO₂, which is increasing due to the burning of fossil fuels,
119 deforestation of large areas, and other causes. Other GHGs supplementing CO₂ are methane,
120 nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbons, and ozone. CO₂ is approximately 36% higher than in pre-
121 industrial times. From 1990 to 2006 alone the Annual GHG index recently introduced by the U.S.
122 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, shows that from 1990 to 2006 the radiative
123 forcing by all long-lived GHGs has increased by 22.7%.

124 *a. Modeling approach*

125 Global Circulation Models, or Global Climate Models (GCMs), take the basic principles of
126 physics, including conservation of momentum, mass, and energy, and use computer simulations to
127 project the evolving coupled atmospheric and oceanic state in accordance with these accepted
128 principles. Discretized equations are used to advance in time the quantities measuring the
129 properties of the atmosphere or ocean. These properties, the temperature, winds or currents, and
130 humidity or salinity, are defined at a fine three-dimensional grid network covering the global
131 domain. The ocean is an extremely important reservoir of the energy and momentum, as well as

132 CO₂ for the atmosphere on climate time scales. Various intricacies are important in the modeling
133 effort, including the role of moisture and clouds in the atmosphere.

134 The evolution of the model depends on atmospheric forcing, such as the incoming solar energy, as
135 well as the chemical composition of the atmosphere itself. The GHGs interact with the flows of
136 solar and thermal (i.e., infrared) energy, and change the heat balance of the atmosphere. Since the
137 beginning of the industrial era, and more so in the recent era, significant amounts of CO₂ and other
138 GHGs have been injected into the atmosphere principally as a result of human activities.

139 GCMs have been developed at several of the world's major weather centers, government
140 laboratories and universities, including ones in the U.S., Japan, Russia, and Europe. These have
141 been the basis for climate projections reported by the IPCC. Each GCM uses techniques that have
142 been developed by their respective scientists but in many cases are based on the same antecedents
143 and there is a risk that climate models share similar errors. As a result of uncertainties in the
144 models and the data provided to the models, a spread of the projected quantities almost invariably
145 exists. We use the distribution among the ensemble of model results to present the possible
146 climate outcomes. Here a common result or a mean is the best estimate from the modeling
147 approach as a whole. The spread amongst the models provides an estimate of uncertainty, a large
148 spread reducing the confidence in the mean result.

149 We have accessed 11 coupled atmosphere-ocean model runs, all for a scenario in which 1%
150 increase in CO₂ per year occurs, until the CO₂ concentration doubles; this is one of several IPCC
151 scenarios that have been studied. These model results are from the World Climate Research
152 Programme's (WCRP's) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP3) multi-model

153 dataset (Meehl et al. 2007a, b). The models used are listed in Table 1. Since our analysis is based
154 on a single GHG scenario, denoted **A1B**, uncertainties associated with future emissions of GHGs
155 are not accounted for. The various scenarios as described in the IPCC Special Report on
156 Emissions Scenarios (SRES, 2000; summarized on p. 44 of IPCC, 2007) cover a wide range of
157 future economic, population, and technology projections. Scenario A1B describes a future with
158 rapid growth, population peaking by mid-century and advanced technology with a balance of
159 energy sources (Meehl et al. 2007).

160 To determine and evaluate the changes over the regions of the continental United States, we use an
161 ensemble of such models to study the upcoming several decades until the middle of the 21st
162 century. For projections of trends between now and mid-century, we divide the continental U.S.
163 into five regions—the Northeast, South, Great Lakes, Upper Midwest and West—as depicted in
164 Fig. 3, that are based on energy usage. The Northeast dominates the heating oil market. The Great
165 Lakes and Upper Midwest are mostly heated with natural gas. In the South and West, air
166 conditioning is the greatest energy concern. Note that in the West this energy demand is
167 dominated by the large Southwestern cities.

168 For each model, we extracted the surface temperature at each model grid point in the U.S. region
169 for each time period, and then assigned them to the five regions (Fig. 3) in which they are located:
170 Northeast, South, Great Lakes, Upper Midwest, and West. The grid-point values were weighted by
171 area, and then averaged within decades: 1990s (i.e., 1990-1999), 2000s, 2010s, 2020s, 2030s, and
172 2040s. Not all data was available for all models.

173 We chose the three winter months (December-January-February, or DJF) and summer months
174 (June-July-August, or JJA), as the basis of the study, largely because these capture the extremes in
175 space heating and cooling, the two major energy uses. Winter and summer are also the seasons
176 showing the largest and smallest temperature increases during the latter half of the 20th century.

177 *b. U.S. temperature trends and differences*

178 As context, we first present in the lower panel of Fig. 4 the decadal trend (estimated 50-year
179 change) from the observation data set of the Climate Research Unit. At the end of the twentieth
180 century, the United States experienced warming across most if not the entire country. In the areas
181 in the North Central U.S. in the winter months of December-January-February trends were
182 typically between 1 and 2 °C (Fig. 3) while the June-July-August (JJA) season had a considerably
183 smaller increase throughout the middle of the U.S. of -0.5 – 1.0 °C (Fig. 3). As we will show, this
184 observed warming trend is predicted by the models to accelerate for the first half of the twenty-
185 first century.

186 Results for the mean and range of the change in temperature between the 1990s and 2040s for the
187 five regions and the U.S. as a whole, for both the DJF and JJA seasons, are given in Table 2. There
188 is considerable spread around each of the means from the ensemble of models. However, treating
189 the set of models as an ensemble, and determining their means, we find that all regions have an
190 increasing trend for both seasons. The regional increases in temperatures for the 50-year period are
191 all within the range of 0.5 to 1.2 °C. A more complete discussion of regional temperature increases
192 and decreases follows in the next section.

193 For the 2040s and the U.S. region as a whole, the ensemble mean projection during the DJF
194 season is 0.8 °C, with individual projections ranging from as low as 0.1 °C to as high as 2.1 °C.
195 For the JJA season, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C with a range of -0.4 and
196 +2.3 °C. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of temperature trend for each decade. In Fig. 5, a great deal
197 of decade-to-decade variability is seen in the individual time series of projected temperature.

198 To examine the regional distribution over the U.S. of projected warming in the two seasons, we
199 first estimate the mean temperature change of the ensemble of models in the midseason months of
200 January and July during the periods 2040-2049 and 1990-1999 in Fig. 6. The differences in both
201 months show values highest in the south-central U.S. (Texas and the southern Great Plains) and
202 the West. Values around 1.5 °F in both seasons are evident.

203 We then chose one of the models in the middle range of temperature increases to show the trends
204 over the periods between 2040-2049 and 1990-1999 (Fig. 7). This is an example of how a single
205 model may be similar to or different from the ensemble mean. Here we present the results in °C
206 per fifty-year change. In both the DJF and JJA seasons, the largest trends of expected increase in
207 this model are in the middle of the country, centering on the Great Plains. The maximum value
208 for temperature trend in JJA was around 2.0 °C per half century, somewhat less than the 2.25 °C
209 per decade for DJF. Away from the maximum situated over Kansas, the values reduce steadily. At
210 the southeast Atlantic coast for example, both seasons have values closer to 0.8 °C per half
211 century. Comparing Figs. 6 and 7, we see that the mean of the ensemble exhibits smaller spatial
212 scales than the individual ensemble member. Each ensemble member has relatively smooth spatial
213 patterns, but since these patterns do not line up from one model to the next, the mean contains
214 smaller scales.

215 *c. Regional implications*

216 The U.S., a country with a broad geographical spread and large variety of climatic types, is
217 affected in different regions by a variety of external forcing factors. Oceanic circulations,
218 prevailing wind patterns, and proximity to water bodies all affect different parts of the country in
219 different ways. This climatic variability affects how climate change in the upcoming decades of
220 the 21st century will manifest itself in different regions of the country, as described in the
221 following subsections. Nevertheless, temperature increases are expected in all regions at all future
222 times examined. Results are plotted and presented in most detail for temperature changes through
223 the 2040s, but some results for projected changes in precipitation over the next 100 years are also
224 summarized, taken from other studies to provide a more complete picture of anticipated regional
225 climate change.

226 For comparison we have examined the results from an earlier set of models that were the basis of
227 the study by the U.S. Science Climate Program, in particular the set of model results cited by
228 Ruosteenoja et al. (2003) for the period from 2000-2050. Analyses for three regions, Western,
229 Central and Eastern U.S. (but including parts of Canada) for the first part of the century have DJF
230 means equivalent to 1.6, 1.6, 1.8 °C, and for JJA 1.8, 1.8, 1.6 °C, respectively (USCCP 2008).
231 These values are larger than those in Table 2 for two reasons. First, the Ruosteenoja regions
232 include parts of Canada, closer to the pole, where more pronounced climate change warming is
233 expected. Second, the Ruosteenoja results are based on earlier, somewhat less highly resolved
234 atmosphere-ocean coupled models, which had the physics and resolution that was state-of-the-art
235 prior to 2002.

236 1) NORTHEAST REGION

237 For winter temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C.
238 However, the individual projections range from a decrease of 0.8 °C to an increase of 2.6 °C. Note
239 that individual models project fluctuations in the intervening decades rather than a steady
240 monotonic increase in temperature (Fig. 8). Results for summer are similar. For summer
241 temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C with a range of
242 -0.9 to +2.3 °C.

243 Other studies indicate that the number of hot days will also increase. By 2100, most New England
244 cities are likely to experience more than 60 days/year with summer temperatures above 90 °F (32
245 °C), including 14 to 28 days above 100 °F (38 °C). With regard to precipitation, as winter
246 temperatures increase, more precipitation will fall as rain and less as snow. Additionally, late
247 summer and fall droughts are forecast to increase significantly (Frumhoff et al., 2007).

248 2) SOUTH REGION

249 For winter temperatures in the 2040s (Fig. 9), the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7
250 °C. The individual projections range from a decrease of 0.3 °C to an increase of 2.2 °C. For
251 summer temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C with a
252 range of -0. to +1.9 °C.

253 Different models show different changes in precipitation over the next 100 years. The Southeast is
254 currently the wettest region of the contiguous U.S. In the long term, some models, in particular the
255 Canadian model, simulate a 10% reduction in annual average precipitation by 2090, while other

256 models show a nearly 20% increase. Depending on which model is consulted, the Southeast may
257 or may not remain the wettest region of the U.S. (Burkett et al., 2001).

258 3) GREAT LAKES REGION

259 For winter temperatures in the 2040s (Fig. 10), the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.8
260 °C. The individual projections range from a decrease of 0.4 °C to an increase of 2.6 °C. For
261 summer temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C with a
262 range of -0.8 to +2.5 °C.

263 Precipitation amounts are likely to increase 10 to 30% across much of the region, with associated
264 increases in both the frequency and intensity of precipitation events. Increased evaporation and
265 lower soil moisture levels throughout the region, combined with greater mean precipitation and
266 increased rainfall intensity, is expected to lead to increased flooding (Easterling and Karl, 2001).

267 4) UPPER MIDWEST REGION

268 For winter temperatures in the 2040s (Fig. 11), the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 1.0
269 °C. The individual projections range from a decrease of 0.4 °C to an increase of 2.4 °C. For
270 summer temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.6 °C with a
271 range of -1.5 to +2.4 °C. The range for summer is very large. In fact, the 2040s are actually
272 projected to be cooler than the 2030s, but would not be if the one extreme cooling projection were
273 omitted.

274 For precipitation, earlier estimates showed some increases in the western Plains, along the Rocky
275 Mountains, with the overall average annual precipitation increasing by at least 13%. This

276 increased precipitation will occur in more intense rainfall events, particularly in the southern
277 Plains. Even though rainfall will increase on average, it will not be uniform and because some
278 areas will become drier and everywhere temperatures will be warmer, there will be more intense
279 droughts especially in the lee of the Rocky Mountains where precipitation is predicted to decrease
280 (Joyce, 2001; Schubert et al., 2008).

281 5) WEST REGION

282 For winter temperatures in the 2040s (Fig. 12), the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 1.1
283 °C. The individual projections range from an increase of 0.1 °C to an increase of 2.5 °C. For
284 summer temperatures in the 2040s, the ensemble mean projection is an increase of 0.7 °C with a
285 range of -0.4 to +2.6 °C. Note that the uncertainty for the West region is less than for the other
286 regions.

287 Models show increased precipitation particularly in winter over California, but drying over parts
288 of the Rockies. Projected annual precipitation changes range from a small decrease (about 7%) to
289 a slightly larger increase (up to 14%) through 2050 and from nearly 0% to up to 50% through the
290 2090s. While precipitation is expected to increase, so are fires. It is projected that large wildfires
291 will increase 10%-40%, with increases as high as 90% in Northern California (Smith et al., 2001).

292 **3. Impacts of temperature changes**

293 Of all the weather elements that impact the way we live and do business—temperature, humidity,
294 precipitation, wind—temperature is most directly related to our heating and cooling needs.
295 Energy required for heating and cooling, as well as for providing hot water, will be impacted as

296 climate changes. Besides direct heat exchange, there are other economic sectors, including
297 transportation and agriculture, in which temperature changes directly impact the amount of energy
298 consumed. Production of energy is also affected in multiple ways by temperature changes. Finally
299 there will be many indirect effects on society because the earth system contains many interacting
300 sub-systems with multitudes of feedbacks—some positive, some negative —operating on a wide
301 range of space and time scales.

302 *a. Energy usage for heating and cooling*

303 Estimates are that 26 Quads (1 Quad = 1 Quadrillion BTUs or British Thermal Units) of energy
304 will be delivered to residential and commercial buildings in the U.S. by the 2030s (USCCSP,
305 2008). Changes in climate that imply warming will reduce the energy needed for space heating
306 overall in residential and commercial settings. This impact is most important wherever significant
307 heating is required, peaking in the colder northern climate zones of the country. Conversely, the
308 air conditioning that is in use throughout the U.S. during warm weather will demand more energy
309 as temperatures warm.

310 Whether expected temperature increases will produce an overall net increase or decrease in energy
311 consumption relates to the particulars of a region. The proportional increase or decrease in fuel
312 used in space heating depends in part on the particular energy sources or fuels. Overall, a greater
313 proportion of fuel oil will be saved by the effect of temperature change on heating than for other
314 fuels since fuel oil is basically used only for heating while gas and electric are used for many
315 purposes. For the increase in energy for space cooling used during ambient temperature increase,
316 the dependence of the zone on amount of space cooling generally in use is important. In parts of

317 the country, especially the northern zone or in a maritime city like San Francisco, air conditioning
318 is less prevalent than others. In such locations, increases in the summer temperature will not only
319 raise energy use among people who already use space cooling, but it will lead others to cool their
320 residences when they may not previously have done so. In this case, the impact of an increase in
321 temperature will have a higher proportional effect.

322 The impact of temperature changes in the regions for space cooling and heating was analyzed by
323 Hadley et al. (2006) for the period through the 2020s based on the Parallel Climate Model-
324 Integrated Biosphere Simulator (Washington et al., 2000), and estimated population and energy
325 statistics from the U.S. Department of Energy. Figure 13 shows results from the Hadley et al.
326 (2006) low temperature change global warming scenario fit to our five regions in terms of energy
327 changes for cooling, for heating, and the net increase in energy usage. Their low temperature
328 change scenario is the one most consistent with our model results. It can be seen that South and
329 West regions have energy increases for cooling larger than energy increases for warming, whereas
330 the Northeast and Great Lakes regions have more energy saved for heating than expended for
331 cooling. The Upper Midwest is roughly in balance with small differences. Overall, for the U.S.
332 approximately 5% more energy will be needed for space cooling and heating combined. We
333 estimate this amount to double by mid-century.

334 Overall in the U.S., according to Scott et al. (2005), a reduction between 4% and 20% in the
335 demand for residential heating was projected given an expected mean temperature increase in the
336 range between 0.4 and 3.2 °C. By the decade of the 2040s we have projected an overall increase of
337 0.8 °C in the winter months in the U.S., according to the ensemble of GCMs; our result concurs in
338 this regard with the earlier results of Rosenthal et al. (1995). Here we have a reduction by about

339 10% in the space heating requirements of the U.S. Based on 0.8 °C of warming in the winter, costs
340 for heating of commercial buildings will decrease, but the amount of energy savings will depend
341 on fuel type. Decreases are projected of about 3% for electricity and natural gas, but overall, in
342 areas where fuel oil is prevalent, a reduction up to 12% is anticipated (Mansur et al., 2005). These
343 impacts may vary with region, particularly in the Northeast, which has many older, less efficient
344 commercial buildings,

345 Balancing the heating mentioned above, the increased surface temperatures will, of course,
346 increase the amount of cooling necessary to reduce the temperature to the same level during
347 periods of the year needing air-cooling. In the U.S., nearly all air conditioning is accomplished
348 using electricity, which is produced by a variety of different energy sources. Increases in air
349 conditioning have a direct impact on peak electricity demand (e.g., Franco and Sanstad 2006 for
350 California). Another factor here is the increase in energy needed in air conditioning due to higher
351 humidity. Warmer air can hold more absolute moisture, and when moisture is removed from the
352 air, energy is used to condense the water vapor in addition to cooling the air, representing a
353 nonlinear relationship between the amount of energy needed for air-cooling and the increase in
354 ambient temperature (Gatley, 2005). As a proxy for humidity, precipitation was used in the study
355 of Mansur et al. (2005); in the average range of values, they noted that a one-inch monthly
356 increase in rainfall would lead to a 7% increase in electricity usage

357 Again, the air-cooling requirements can be separated into residential and commercial spaces. In
358 residential spaces, Scott et al. (2005) estimated that an increase of 0.4 to 3.2 °C summer
359 temperatures results in a corresponding 8 to 39% increase in national annual cooling energy
360 consumption in residential units. Our measure of mean summer increase by 2040 from the

361 ensemble of models is 0.7 °C, equivalent to approximately a 12% increase in energy from air
362 conditioning.

363 Much of the industrial consumption of energy is not related to the ambient temperature, with the
364 obvious exceptions of heating and cooling of the buildings. Estimates are that only 6% of the
365 industrial use of energy is related to space conditioning (EIA, 2002). Given the studies cited here,
366 a mean increase in temperature in the U.S. of 0.7 °C will create approximately an increase of 0.6
367 to 0.9% in energy used for air-cooling in commercial buildings.

368 On balance, increased use of energy due to air conditioning in buildings throughout the U.S. can
369 exceed the decreased use due to heating, according to some studies, particularly in the southern
370 areas. In the next thirty years, there will be roughly a balance in the amount of energy used. An
371 increase of 0.8 °C will project onto a roughly 15% increase in cooling, assuming the relationships
372 in Scott et al. (2005).

373 Nationally, we can scale the results we found for the U.S. as a whole to estimate the overall
374 changes in energy usage by region of space heating and cooling, based on the ensemble of model
375 results we developed. We can also to estimate the situation in each region based on the studies and
376 methodology in Scott et al. (2005). For example, for the Northeast, models shows a 0.7 °C
377 increase in both DJF and JJA, marginally less than the 0.8 and 0.7 °C increases found for the
378 whole U.S.

379 As noted, domestic hot water will require less energy for heating, and this will occur in all seasons
380 and all regions. The amount of energy required to raise water temperature from 50 °F and 120 °F,

381 (10 °C and 49 °C) a typical scenario, will be reduced by approximately 2%, given that increases in
382 air temperature are mirrored in the input water temperatures.

383 Our projection is that the overall energy use for space heating and cooling will increase by about
384 two Quads of energy by the 2040s (Fig. 13), almost 10% of the 26 Quads to be used for space
385 heating and cooling in the U.S. Of course, a number of more energy efficient technologies are
386 being developed in the interim that can dramatically reduce the energy needed in many areas,
387 including space heating and cooling, transportation, industry and agriculture. Also, southward
388 population shifts that are occurring now, if continued, will lead to greater overall energy usage
389 since the regions using more energy as temperature increases have faster growing populations.

390 **4. Conclusion**

391 GHGs are the major, widely accepted forcing of global warming, and temperature changes from
392 greenhouse gas forcing will be greatest at higher latitudes. Warming in the 20th century is now
393 known to be greater than initially thought. The annual temperature over the U.S. has actually
394 increased the most in the very recent years, showing a warming acceleration. When a network of
395 stations was examined in the Northeast, warming was found at all but 2 of the 73 stations
396 (Trombulak and Wolfson, 2004). For the globe, even if increases in GHGs had been stopped at
397 year 2000, we are already committed to 0.4-0.6 °C (depending on model) more global warming by
398 year 2100 compared to 0.6°C of warming for the 20th century (Meehl et al. 2005; IPCC 2007)
399 while for the US those values are higher.

400 We have determined that, based on the average of a set of complex atmospheric model
401 projections, the temperature will increase in the United States in each of its regions throughout the

402 first half of the twenty-first century in both winter and summer. The spread in the set of models
403 indicates a substantial uncertainty in the average amount. Space heating energy requirements will
404 be reduced and air cooling requirements will be increased in all regions of the United States,
405 though the net effect will be energy savings in the North and energy increases in the South and
406 West. Overall, we estimate future energy consumption for space heating and cooling to increase
407 for the U.S. by up to 10% by the 2040's. Temperature increases impact a number of other
408 activities including energy production by power plants, hot water heating, transportation, and
409 demand for electricity.

410 Though the projected rise in temperatures that we note here have particularly strong impacts for
411 energy, land use, ecology, and the overall economy, these are not the only factors that may be
412 projected to occur in a climate-changed world. Other quantities of note are increases in sea level,
413 storminess and the water cycle. Energy facilities over low-lying areas, including power plants in
414 Florida and elsewhere, and refineries in Texas will be greatly impacted by changes in sea level by
415 mid-century. Increased storminess will additionally impact offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of
416 Mexico. Cooling water supplies for power plants will be affected by changes in the hydrological
417 cycle. Areas in the Western U.S. and elsewhere may be especially affected by changes in the
418 hydrological cycle because the expected precipitation changes may amplify the impacts of social
419 and population changes.

420 Other economic sectors upon which climate change will have dramatic impacts in the next half-
421 century are transportation and agriculture. Fundamentally, all trends in the different sectors put our
422 society at risk economically. National security risks may also increase as societies around the

423 world are subjected to climate change stresses. It is critical that all such projections be evaluated
424 carefully at the current time as they have great economic and political consequences.

425 All climate change projections, and hence all climate change impacts, have some degree of
426 uncertainty. Further, many of the elements of weather that make up the climate have large
427 variability. Uncertainties in one aspect of climate science—how raindrops form—can propagate
428 and amplify through the earth system feedbacks to affect many other phenomena—soil moisture,
429 river flooding, etc. Not only are there uncertainties in the input scenarios to the climate change
430 analysis methods and in the climate models, there may be structural uncertainty in the analysis
431 methods and models themselves. In our analyses even for a well-resolved parameter—surface air
432 temperature—we find large uncertainties for regional projections. Improvements to reduce the
433 model component of the uncertainty are anticipated, but prediction of GHG scenarios remains a
434 major challenge.

435 **Acknowledgements**

436 We acknowledge the modeling groups, the Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and
437 Intercomparison (PCMDI) and the WCRP's Working Group on Coupled Modelling (WGCM) for
438 their roles in making available the WCRP CMIP3 multi-model dataset. Support of this dataset is
439 provided by the Office of Science, U.S. Department of Energy.

440

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518 *Table Legends:*

519 *Table 1. Global Circulation Models that produced projections aggregated here.*

520 *Table 2. Model projections of the mean and range (maximum and minimum) of the differences*
521 *between the 2040s and the 1990s. A t-statistic for the ensemble of differences is also presented.*
522 *For reference, one-sided t-tests with 9 degrees of freedom are significant at the 90, 95, and 99%*
523 *level if the t-statistic exceeds 1.383, 1.833 and 2.821 respectively.*

524

525 Figure Legends:

526 *Figure 1. Annual average global surface temperature anomalies relative to the 1951-1980 mean.*
527 *Data source is the NASA GISTEMP dataset (Hansen et al. 1999).*

528 *Figure 2. Trends in annual average surface temperature (1950-1999). These trends are based on*
529 *a linear in time fit to the gridded observation data set of the Climate Research Unit (University of*
530 *East Anglia, U.K.) CRUTEM3 land-surface temperature data set (Brohan et al. 2006). Units are*
531 *°C/50 years.*

532 *Figure 3. The five regions of the U.S. considered in this study.*

533 *Figure 4. Observed trends in seasonal average surface temperature (1950-1999). As in Fig. 2, but*
534 *for the U.S. for a) winter and b) summer.*

535 *Figure 5. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the entire U.S. The left panel*
536 *is for DJF and the right panel is for JJA. The ensemble mean is plotted in thick plot lines with*
537 *diamonds plotted at each decade. The ensemble distribution is shown as a boxplot for each*
538 *decade. In Fig. 5 and similar figures, a boxplot is displayed for each decade. The boxplot*
539 *summarizes the key characteristics of the distribution of projected temperature changes. The box*
540 *itself encloses the data in the 25th to 75th percentile. The median is shown as a thick horizontal*
541 *bar inside the box. The whiskers extend to the extreme values. The actual time series for each*
542 *model are plotted as light grey lines.*

543 *Figure 6. Ensemble mean trends over the period between the 2040s and 1990s for the U.S. for a)*
544 *winter and b) summer. The ensemble mean 50-year differences for January and July are shown.*

545 *Figure 7. Single model trends over the period between the 2040s and 1990s for the U.S. for a)*
546 *winter and b) summer. Shown are the trends in °C/50-years for 3-month seasons.*

547 *Figure 8. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the Northeast region as in*
548 *Fig. 5.*

549 *Figure 9. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the South region as in Fig. 5.*

550 *Figure 10. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the Great Lakes region as*
551 *in Fig. 5.*

552 *Figure 11. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the Upper Midwest region*
553 *as in Fig. 5.*

554 *Figure 12. Temperature change for an ensemble of climate models for the Western region as in*
555 *Fig. 5.*

556 *Figure 13. Projected changes in energy required for heating and cooling, and the net changes, as*
557 *departures from a current case for temperature increase scenarios to 2025. Positive values*
558 *correspond to increased energy usage. (Based on the low temperature change scenario in Hadley*
559 *et al., 2006.)*

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565 **TABLES**

566 **Table 1.**

Abbreviation	Center name	Country
BCCR	Bjerknes Center	Norway
CCCMA	Canadian Center for Climate	Canada
GFDL	NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory	US
GISS	NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies	US
IAP	Institute of Atmospheric Physics	China
INMCM	Institute of Numerical Mathematics	Russia
MIROC HI RES	Meteorological Institute	Japan
MIROC MED RES	Meteorological Institute	Japan
MIUB	Meteorological Institute of the University of Bonn	Germany
MPI	Max Planck Institute	Germany
NCAR	National Center for Atmospheric Research	US

567 **Table 2.**

Region	DJF Mean	DJF Range	t-statistic	JJA Mean	JJA Range	t-statistic
Northeast	0.7	-0.8 – 2.6	2.1	0.7	-0.9 – 2.3	2.2
South	0.7	-0.3 – 2.2	2.9	0.7	-0.3 – 1.9	2.4
Great Lakes	0.8	-0.4 – 2.6	2.7	0.7	-0.8 – 2.5	2.3
Upper Midwest	1.0	-0.4 – 2.4	4.0	0.6	-1.5 – 2.4	1.5
West	1.1	0.1 – 2.5	4.3	0.7	-0.4 – 2.6	2.4
CONUS	0.8	0.1 – 2.1	3.6	0.7	-0.4 – 2.3	2.3




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


Figure 2.



Figure 3.






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



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




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


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



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



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



Figure 10.





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



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


Figure 13.